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Divergent Intergroup Perspectives ⓐ

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Abstract and Keywords

Interactions between members of different groups are substantially more challenging cognitively, emotionally, and socially than are exchanges between members of the same group. This chapter considers how these processes form a psychological basis for divergent intergroup perspectives. In particular, perceptions of membership in different social categories influence evaluations and expectations of others. These processes create initial biases that may systematically be reinforced by the ways people behave (often automatically and unconsciously) toward others, how they interpret others' behaviors, and the different goals they have in intergroup interaction. Efforts to appear unbiased can also sometimes backfire, contributing to miscommunication and increasing tension. Nevertheless, divergent group perspectives and consequent misunderstandings, tension, and conflict are far from inevitable. Structural, contextual, and psychological interventions can promote mutual understanding and coordinated efforts to improve intergroup relations, reduce conflict, and achieve peace.

Keywords: Discrimination, intergroup bias, intergroup contact, power, prejudice, social categorization

Divergent intergroup perspectives and consequent intergroup misunderstandings contribute directly to intergroup competition and mistrust, from which a single incident can ignite into intergroup conflict. Members of groups in conflict typically view the same incident in fundamentally different, often self-serving ways. In 2000, a series of suicide bombings and shootings by Palestinians killed 39 Israelis. In response, the Israeli military invaded several Palestinian towns; 67 Palestinians died. Only 18% of Israeli Jews characterized the Israeli actions as a form of terrorism, whereas 95% described the Palestinian actions as terrorism; by contrast, 92% of Palestinians saw the Israeli military action as terrorism, but only 13% interpreted the Palestinian violence as terrorism (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002). Even when groups are not in overt conflict, such as in relations between advantaged and disadvantaged groups within the same society, members of different groups tend to have divergent perspectives on their relationship. In the United

States, for example, nearly three fourths of blacks but only one third of whites reported in a national survey that racial discrimination was a major factor accounting for disparities between the groups in income and education levels (Gallup Minority Rights and Relations Survey, 2007; USA Today/Gallup, 2008).

The present chapter considers the psychological bases of divergent intergroup perspectives and how they shape intergroup misunderstandings and, ultimately, conflict. A large proportion of the empirical literature that we review on this topic focuses on majority and minority group relations (and more specifically, black-white relations in the United States), but we consider more broadly the (p. 159) psychological dynamics underlying divergent perspectives on relations between and within nations internationally.

Divergent intergroup perspectives may be so pervasive because they are rooted in fundamental psychological processes. Two essential qualities of human beings that have played a critical role across the species' evolutionary history are the development of intellect and the social nature of human existence. Both are critical for the survival of individuals and the groups to which they belong. These characteristics, however, also influence how people perceive others, interpret behaviors, and respond to others in ways that systematically contribute to divergent group perspectives.

According to evolutionary psychologists, the capacity to understand one's environment through intellect represents one of the most critical developments benefiting human survival as a species (Schaller, Conway, & Peavy, 2010). This human adaptation involves psychological processes regarding the information to which people attend (Maner, Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller, 2007), how they learn and acquire knowledge (Öhman & Mineka, 2001), and how they rely on cognitive shortcuts in information processing to cope with complex inputs (Gigerenzer, Todd, et al., 1999).

Human beings are not only uniquely intelligent animals, humans are also fundamentally social animals. Group living is today, as it has been throughout human history, essential to survival. Human activity is rooted in interdependence. Group systems involving greater mutual cooperation have substantial survival advantages for individual group members over those systems without reciprocally positive social relations (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008). However, the decision to cooperate with nonrelatives (i.e., to expend resources for another's benefit) hinges on trust because the ultimate benefit for the provider depends on others' willingness to reciprocate. Indiscriminate trust and altruism that are not reciprocated are not effective survival strategies. Social categorization and group boundaries provide the bases for achieving the benefits of cooperative interdependence without the risk of excessive costs (Brewer, 2007). Membership in a group is a form of contingent cooperation. By limiting

aid to mutually acknowledged ingroup members, total costs and risks of nonreciprocation can be contained. Thus, ingroups are bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit mutual interdependence and cooperation (Brewer, 2008; Brewer & Caporael, 2006). Individuals derive material benefit and experience an essential sense of belonging and security from their group affiliation (Correll & Park, 2005).

The combination of intellect, which motivates the efficient acquisition of information, and group affinity, which guides social behavior, significantly shapes the way people perceive and interact with others. The basic premise of this chapter is that these fundamental human qualities influence (1) how others are perceived and evaluated; (2) the expectations that people bring to intergroup interactions; (3) how people interpret the behaviors of others and respond to others, sometimes automatically and unconsciously; and (4) the role of group power in shaping the different experiences and perspectives of group members. The chapter concludes by considering ways that intergroup misunderstandings can be reduced and the implications for intergroup conflict and conflict resolution generally.

Understanding others, both members of ingroups and members of outgroups, is a challenging but necessary element of human existence. To cope with the enormous complexity of the world, people abstract meaning from their perceptions and develop heuristics and other simplifying principles for thinking about important elements in their environment. Categorization is one of the most basic processes in the way that people actively derive meaning from complex environments.

Social Categorization and Perceptions of Others

Because of the fundamental importance of categorization for psychological functioning, one universal facet of human thinking essential for efficient functioning is the ability to quickly and effectively sort the many different objects, events, and people into meaningful categories (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Categorization enables decisions about incoming information to be made quickly, because the instant an object is categorized it is assigned the properties shared by other category members. Thus, time-consuming consideration of the meaning of every experience is eliminated because it is inefficient. Categorization often occurs automatically on the basis of physical similarity, proximity, or shared fate (Campbell, 1958). In this respect, people compromise total accuracy for efficiency when confronted with the often overwhelming complexity of their social world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 2007).

Thinking about others in terms of their group membership (social categorization) rather than (p. 160) their individual qualities has a profound impact on social relations. It influences the ways people perceive, think about, and evaluate others (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). When people or objects are categorized into groups, real differences between members of the same category tend to be perceptually minimized in making decisions or forming impressions (Tajfel, 1969). Members of the same category are regarded as more similar than they actually are, and more similar than they were before they were categorized together. In addition, distinctions between members of different categories become exaggerated. Thus, categorization enhances perceptions of similarities within and differences between groups. This process is particularly ominous for social categorization because these within- and between-group distortions have a tendency to be perceived as inherent in the nature of the groups (see Jost & Hamilton, 2005; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010) and generalize to additional dimensions (e.g., character traits) beyond those that differentiated the categories originally (Allport, 1954).

Moreover, in the process of social categorization, people spontaneously classify others as members of their own group (i.e., ingroup) or as a member of a different group (i.e., outgroup) (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Sumner, 1906)—that is, differentiating people into "we's" and "they's" (see also Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Upon classifying people as members of the ingroup or outgroups, people view ingroup members more favorably (Brewer, 1979; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010), particularly those ingroup members who are most prototypical of their group (Hogg & Hains, 1996). They are more likely to recognize unique and disparate qualities among ingroup members while viewing outgroup members as more homogeneous (i.e., similar to one another; Boldry, Gaertner, & Quinn, 2007). People also believe that ingroup members are more capable of expressing uniquely human emotions than are outgroup members (Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt, & Paladino, 2007), and they value the lives of ingroup members more than those of outgroup members (Pratto & Glasford, 2008). Also, ingroup membership increases the psychological bond and feelings of "oneness" that facilitate the arousal of empathy in response to their needs or problems (Hornstein, 1976). In part as a consequence, people are more cooperative with other ingroup members than outgroup members (Kramer & Brewer, 1984) and they more readily offer assistance to ingroup members (Dovidio, Gaertner, et al., 1997; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Nier, Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, & Ward, 2001; see also Roccas & Elster, this volume).

In addition to influencing the ways people consciously think about and report their responses (i.e., explicit responses), information about group membership also affects the way people spontaneously, automatically, and sometimes unconsciously respond to others (i.e., implicit responses; see Fazio & Olson, 2003). Research using implicit measures (e.g.,

the Implicit Association Test; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) reveals that people spontaneously activate differential evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), as well as prejudices and stereotypes of specific groups (Blair, 2001). Moreover, measures of physiological responses (e.g., cardiac response; Blascovich, Mendes, & Seery, 2002) and brain activation (using both ERP and fMRI techniques; He, Johnson, Dovidio, & McCarthy, 2009; Phelps et al., 2000) indicate that people experience greater threat when presented with outgroup than ingroup members. Implicit associations and explicit attitudes, which differ in controllability and origins (e.g., earlier versus more current experiences and associations; Rudman, Phelan, & Heppen, 2007), are only weakly associated (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009).

Taken together, these findings demonstrate the pervasive and fundamental way that social categorization into ingroups and outgroups have on the ways people perceive, think about, and feel about others. These processes in themselves provide a basis for systemic biases and discrimination in evaluating the attributes of others (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002). Biases such as these, however, not only affect how people unilaterally respond in assessing and evaluating others but also influence how people anticipate intergroup interactions and how they contingently respond in these encounters.

Anticipating and Initiating Interaction

As people approach interactions, information that their partner is a member of their own group or of another group arouses different expectations and emotional reactions. People generally assume that ingroup members share their attitudes and beliefs more than outgroup members do (Robbins & Krueger, 2005), and often expect outgroup members to have a contrasting perspective (Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Copper, 1992). Perhaps as a consequence, people anticipate outgroup members to behave less positively in their interactions. (p. 161) Individuals expect outgroup members to perceive them in negative, stereotypical ways (Frey & Tropp, 2006) and to display bias toward their ingroup (Judd, Park, Yzerbyt, Gordijn, & Muller, 2005). As a consequence, people are less trusting of outgroup than ingroup members (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009) and are vigilant to cues of bias from outgroup members (Vorauer, 2006). In addition, because of suspicions and threat aroused by outgroup members, people show a preference for ingroup members who show bias against an outgroup (Castelli, Tomelleri, & Zogmaister, 2008).

Group-based biases not only shape how people perceive others but also how they believe they are perceived (i.e., metaperceptions; see Frey & Tropp, 2006). Vorauer, Main, and O'Donnell (1998) demonstrated that white Canadians and Aboriginal Canadians believed that the other group had a negative stereotype of them (i.e., negative metastereotypes), which produced negative expectations for their interaction. Shelton and Richeson (2005) found that both whites and blacks in the United States were personally interested in intergroup interaction, but they avoided these interactions because they anticipated that their overtures would be rejected by members of the other group. Furthermore, the negative impact of metaperceptions is greater when people are more invested in an intergroup interaction, such as when they are more motivated to engage in intergroup interaction (Shelton, Richeson, & Bergsieker, 2009) or try to empathize with a member of another group (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009).

Because of greater uncertainty and negative expectations, people approach intergroup interactions with much higher levels of anxiety and greater trepidation than they do for exchanges between members of the same group (Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, & Hodson, 2002; Plant & Butz, 2006). Feelings of anxiety in anticipation of interaction, in turn, also motivate members of majority and minority groups to avoid intergroup interaction (Plant, 2004; Plant & Butz, 2006). By contrast, when minority group members perceive that majority group members value diversity, they are more motivated to engage in intergroup interaction (Tropp & Bianchi, 2006).

When people cannot avoid contact with other groups, negative expectations and feelings of anxiety carry over into the initial stages of intergroup interactions and critically shape the course of these exchanges (Plant, Butz, & Tartakovsky, 2008; Stephan & Stephan, 1985, 2000). In addition to the general impact of uncertainty and negative expectations, there are unique factors that influence majority and minority group members during intergroup interaction. Majority group members, who are often concerned about appearing biased, experience greater self-consciousness (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Shelton, 2003; see Richeson & Shelton, 2010). Minority group members, because of their chronic stigmatization and vulnerability, are especially vigilant for signals of rejection or bias (Vorauer, 2006). This vigilance and consequent responses to cope with anticipated prejudice and discrimination (Hyers & Swim, 1998) further increase the stress they experience in intergroup interaction (Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 2009). Relatively high levels of uncertainty, anxiety, and biased expectations that characterize intergroup interactions can ultimately undermine the usually robust effect of intergroup contact for promoting positive intergroup understanding, empathy, and relations (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008, 2011). For instance, Tropp (2007) found that blacks' perceptions of racial bias among whites in

the United States mitigated the generally positive impact of intergroup contact on their feelings of interracial closeness.

In summary, while social categorization systematically biases intergroup perceptions in ways that enhance evaluation of the ingroup and often disparages the outgroup, the mere anticipation of interaction introduces additional dynamics creating divergent group perspectives. People not only enter interactions with more negative perceptions of outgroup members than ingroup members, but they also believe that outgroup members have negative perceptions of them. However, these metaperceptions typically underestimate the interest in and the desire of members of the other group to engage in positive intergroup contact and overestimate the negativity of their perceptions. As a consequence, people experience high levels of anxiety in anticipation of intergroup contact and avoid these interactions. The avoidance of intergroup interactions, in turn, reinforces intergroup misunderstandings and divergent perspectives. Avoiding contact with members of other groups limits the opportunities for people to correct their misperceptions of the characteristics of members of other groups (N. Miller, 2002) and of the ways that members of other groups view them.

Indeed, intergroup contact is one of the most robust ways to reduce intergroup bias, enhance (p. 162) intergroup understanding, and foster positive intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). Nevertheless, because of the negative expectations and anxiety with which people enter contact situations, intergroup interactions are fragile. While recognizing the general value of intergroup contact (see also Wagner & Hewstone, this volume), in the next section we focus on the ways in which intergroup interactions can go wrong and can, under some conditions, lead to divergent perspectives and intergroup misunderstandings and, potentially, conflict.

Intergroup Interaction and Diverging Perspectives

Traditionally, the study of intergroup interactions has focused on how perceptions and expectations of outgroup members, relative to ingroup members, influence the perceiver's assessments of and reactions to their interaction partner. Consistent with the literature indicating that people attend strongly to information that confirms their group-based expectations (Darley & Gross, 1983), biases are often exacerbated by direct exposure to outgroup members. Interpersonal interactions take on a different frame, an intergroup frame, when they occur between individuals from different groups. In mixed-race interactions, for example, participants typically refer to the cross-race nature of the

exchange in interpreting the other person's actions and making attributions for the other person's behavior (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005).

These perceptions are biased in ways consistent with negative expectancies of intergroup relations (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). For instance, Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Trawalter (2005) demonstrated that blacks who were primed to expect racial prejudice prior to an interracial interaction liked their partner less, experienced more negative affect, and felt less authentic during the interaction than did blacks who were not primed to expect prejudice toward them. As D. T. Miller and Prentice (1999) observed, interpersonal interactions between members of different groups occur across a "category divide." As a consequence, when members of different groups disagree in intergroup interactions, they may assess the situation as being less open to a solution than in within-group interactions. D. T. Miller and Prentice (1999) contend that this misunderstanding can be quite costly because once people label the difference as reflecting group differences, they believe it is especially difficult to resolve the conflict.

In this section, we examine the dynamics of interaction across the "category divide." We consider the contributions that group-based biases involving social cognition, affect and the interpretation of emotion, and implicit attitudes contribute to divergent group perspectives. We further discuss how motivations to be unbiased can have paradoxical effects, further perpetuating divergent intergroup perspectives.

Social Cognition

Group-based biases guide what people attend to and the ways they process information about others (see also Lickel, this volume). People process information more deeply for ingroup than for outgroup members (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008), retain information in a more detailed fashion for ingroup members than outgroup members (Park & Rothbart, 1982), have better memory for information about ways ingroup members are similar and outgroup members are dissimilar to the self (Wilder, 1981), and remember less positive information about outgroup members (Howard & Rothbart, 1980).

Differential expectations also lead people to interpret the behaviors of ingroup and outgroup members in ways that reinforce bias. Positive behaviors and successful outcomes are more likely to be attributed to internal, stable characteristics of ingroup than outgroup members, whereas negative outcomes are more likely to be ascribed to the personalities of outgroup than ingroup members (Hewstone, 1990). In addition, observed behaviors of ingroup and outgroup members are encoded in memory at different levels of abstraction (Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, & Semin, 1989). Undesirable actions of outgroup members are encoded at more abstract levels that presume intentionality and

dispositional origin (e.g., she is hostile) than identical behaviors of ingroup members (e.g., she slapped the girl). Desirable actions of outgroup members, however, are encoded at more concrete levels (e.g., she walked across the street holding the old man's hand) relative to the same behaviors of ingroup members (e.g., she is helpful). Because specific observations tend not to alter more abstract conceptions of a group, positive beliefs about the ingroup and negative representations of the outgroup are highly stable and resistant to change, even in the face of contrary information.

Affect and the Interpretation of Emotion

As noted earlier, intergroup interactions are characterized by a high level of anxiety, which psychophysiologically is associated with a threat (p. 163) response (Blascovich et al., 2002) and behaviorally with an attunement to cues of negativity (Vorauer, 2006). Consequently, people not only typically enter intergroup interactions with more negative expectancies and greater levels of anxiety than they do for intragroup interactions, but also these biases take on a dynamic nature in social exchange (West, Shelton, & Trail, 2009). These processes can combine to create even more divergent perspectives in intergroup interaction.

Biases rooted in group-based expectations critically shape how people perceive emotions displayed by both ingroup members (Beaupré & Hess, 2003) and outgroup members (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003), typically in an expectation-confirming manner. For instance, people are more likely to perceive hostility in the face of an outgroup member (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004) and misperceive neutral facial expressions as conveying anger for outgroup than ingroup members. Social categorization biases also influence how people interpret nonverbal cues related to anxiety (e.g., self-touch, inconsistent gaze, closed posture) displayed by another person with whom they are interacting. Because the nonverbal cues of anxiety overlap with those indicating dislike, anxiety-related behaviors are interpreted as discomfort with the situation when displayed by a member of one's own group but as unfriendliness, as well, when demonstrated by a member of a different group (Dovidio, West, Pearson, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2007).

Attributions of partners' behaviors and the systematic misinterpretations of cues, such as manifestations of anxiety, can have both immediate and longer-term effects on dyadic and group relations. Pearson et al. (2008), for example, showed that intergroup interactions are substantially more fragile than intragroup exchanges. Whereas a slight (1-second) delay in audiovisual feedback between interactants over closed-circuit television, which was imperceptible to participants, had no detrimental affect on same-race dyadic relations, it had a significant adverse effect on cross-race dyadic interactions. Of

particular importance was how this delay led participants in cross-race interactions to perceive their rapport more negatively, compared to participants in a control condition. Participants in cross-race, but not same-race interactions also became more anxious as a function of the delay, and they perceived more anxiety in their partner. However, it was the perception of partner's anxiety, not their personally experienced anxiety that primarily mediated the lower level of rapport. Symmetrical effects were obtained for both white and black interactants. Overall, findings from this study were consistent with those of Dovidio et al. (2007) showing that perceived anxiety carries surplus meaning in cross-race interaction that disrupts rapport-building.

Moreover, these processes, which have been studied primarily in initial interactions between strangers, have persistent effects across time. West et al. (2009), who studied same- and cross-race roommate pairs over 15 days and found that a partner's anxiety was more likely to be perceived as rejection in cross-race than in same-race interactions. In addition, West et al. demonstrated that there was a "contagion" of anxiety between roommates of different races, but not between roommates of the same race: Anxiety experienced by one person predicted their roommates' anxiety the following day. Moreover, the more anxiety interracial roommates experienced across the 15-day period of the study, the less they desired to live together in the future. This pattern of results was similar for racial majority and minority participants. Overall, these findings reveal that for cross-race, but not same-race roommates, not only does partner anxiety linger to influence how people feel themselves the following day, but also the attributions for the anxiety appear to harm the process of relationship formation.

Although both majority and minority group members are vulnerable to many of the same processes contributing to divergent perspectives, there may be distinctive influences, as well. For example, people who feel that their group is the target of prejudice are especially likely to be sensitive to cues of discrimination. With respect to black-white relations in the United States, blacks' daily encounters with potential discrimination may lead individuals to interpretations that confirm that prejudice exists and to label ambiguous behaviors as discriminatory (Operario & Fiske, 2001). Moreover, these tendencies may result in greater accuracy by minority group members in detecting evidence of prejudice and discrimination (Richeson & Shelton, 2005; Rollman, 1978).

Additional research further reveals that blacks and whites may use different cues to detect racial bias, or at the very least, they may have different thresholds for the presence of bias. For example, whites readily identify blatant expressions of bias but tend not to recognize subtle bias; blacks (and other traditionally disadvantaged groups; see Sue, 2010) attend to ambiguous forms of bias (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). Additionally, Richeson and Shelton (2005) showed that black judges (as a set) (p. 164) were better able

to detect both the racial bias levels of white individuals from 20 seconds of their nonverbal behavior during interracial interactions than were white judges.

Taken together, research on intergroup interactions shows consistent biases for interpreting affective cues negatively when they are emitted by outgroup members. As a consequence, the anxiety that may be aroused by the uncertainty of interacting with a member of another group is often interpreted as a sign of dislike when it is displayed by another group. In intergroup interactions, one person's uneasiness becomes another person's dislike, and divergent perspectives develop. Over time, mutual uneasiness can interfere with the ability of members of different groups to develop positive relations on an interpersonal level.

Implicit Bias

In addition to the role of emotion, in intergroup interaction spontaneously activated (implicit) attitudes and stereotypes affect the ways in which people respond to others. Particularly when people lack the motivation, ability to monitor, or cognitive resources to control their behaviors, implicit attitudes and stereotypes predict how people behave toward members of other groups and how they interpret the behaviors of others. In general, implicit intergroup attitudes are a powerful predictor of intergroup behavior (Greenwald et al., 2009), especially for behaviors that are expressed spontaneously (Dovidio, Kawakami, Smoak, & Gaertner, 2009). For instance, implicit prejudice predicts negative nonverbal behavior, which is difficult to monitor and control, in intergroup interactions (Dasgupta & Rivera, 2006; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001).

In addition to implicit activation of attitudes and stereotypes, exposure to a social category can directly activate behavioral dispositions toward members of that group. For instance, whites who were subliminally primed with photographs of blacks displayed more hostility in a subsequent interaction with another white participant than did those primed with photographs of whites and those in a no photograph control condition (Chen & Bargh, 1997). The hostility exhibited by these participants, in turn, elicited more hostile reactions from their partners and created greater conflict in their interaction. Such behavioral predispositions are particularly evident in nonverbal expressions of behavior. For instance, whites use colder voice tones (Weitz, 1972), maintain less eye contact and shorter glances (Fugita, Wexley, & Hillery, 1974), and create greater social distance (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) in interactions with blacks than with whites. In addition, people who interact with others showing greater social distance nonverbally tend to exhibit other less positive behaviors in the interactions (Word et al., 1974).

The subtle, unintentional, and potentially unconscious nature of contemporary racial prejudice in the United States is particularly problematic with respect to producing divergent perspectives in interracial interactions. In particular, whites and blacks have fundamentally different perspectives on the attitudes implied and the actions demonstrated by whites during these interactions. Whites have full access to their explicit attitudes and are able to monitor and control their more overt and deliberative behaviors. These types of attitudes and behaviors are generally nonprejudiced and nondiscriminatory. However, whites do not have such full access to their implicit attitudes or to their less monitorable behaviors. These less easily controlled behaviors, such as nonverbal behaviors, are likely to reflect their unconscious negative feelings and beliefs. As a consequence, whites' beliefs about how they are behaving or how blacks perceive them would be expected to be based primarily on their explicit attitudes and their more overt behaviors, such as the verbal content of their interaction with blacks, and not on their implicit attitudes or less deliberative (i.e., nonverbal) behaviors. In contrast to the perspective of whites, the perspective of black partners in these interracial interactions allows them to attend to both the spontaneous (e.g., nonverbal) and the deliberative (e.g., verbal) behaviors of whites. To the extent that the black partners attend to whites' nonverbal behaviors, which may signal more negativity than their verbal behaviors, blacks are likely to form more negative impressions of the encounter and be less satisfied with the interaction than are whites.

In a study that demonstrated direct support for this reasoning, Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2002) assessed the explicit and implicit racial attitudes of white participants before they engaged in an interracial interaction and same-race interaction. Whites' explicit racial attitudes primarily predicted bias in their more conscious and controllable interpersonal behavior, their verbal friendliness, during their interactions with black and white partners. Whites who reported that they were more prejudiced behaved in a less verbally friendly way toward (p. 165) a black relative to a white partner. However, it was whites' implicit racial attitudes (assessed with a response-latency procedure), not their self-reported prejudice, that predicted bias in their less controllable and monitorable nonverbal behaviors.

In addition, as expected, white participants' impressions of how friendly they behaved were significantly related to their explicit, self-reported racial attitudes and their verbal behavior. Whites who reported that they were less prejudiced and who consequently behaved more positively in what they said believed that they behaved in a more friendly way in the interracial interactions. Because they were less accessible to them, their implicit attitudes and nonverbal behaviors did not relate to their impressions of how friendly they behaved. In contrast, when asked their impressions of how friendly the white person behaved toward them, black partners' judgments were predicted by the

white person's nonverbal behavior, not their verbal behavior. Thus, particularly for whites who were low in explicit prejudice and high in implicit prejudice (which characterizes an aversive racist; see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), blacks and whites had divergent views of the quality of the interaction. In general, white participants believed that they behaved in a friendly and nonprejudiced way, and that the interaction was positive and productive. However, their black partners typically perceived that whites were less friendly than they thought they were, and blacks were less satisfied with the interaction than were whites. Moreover, the black and white interactants were unaware that the other person viewed the experience differently than they did. Thus, these interracial interactions were characterized by divergent perspectives and fundamental misunderstandings.

The dynamics producing divergent intergroup perspectives also operate in relatively structured and task-oriented intergroup interactions (Penner et al., 2010). In interracial interactions with black patients, only doctors' explicit racial attitudes influenced their perceptions of the medical encounter. Lower prejudice-scoring doctors reported after their interaction that they tried to involve the black patient more in decision-making. In contrast, black patients were sensitive to doctors' implicit attitudes. Doctors who had more negative implicit attitudes were seen as less warm and friendly by patients. In addition, patients were least satisfied with their visit when the doctor had positive explicit attitudes and negative implicit attitudes, presumably because the contradictory signals exhibited by the doctor undermined their trust and confidence in the physician.

This last finding reveals the potential paradoxical effects that can occur in intergroup interactions that can produce divergent perspectives between one person, who is consciously motivated to make a positive impression, but whose efforts are undermined by the subtle cues emitted as they attempt to suppress negative thoughts or regulate their behavior.

Paradoxical Effects

In terms of the potential paradoxical effects, intergroup interactions generally, and interracial interactions in particular, are a highly demanding activity for majority group members, particularly among those who are motivated to behave in an unbiased manner and who genuinely strive to be nonprejudiced (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Shelton & Richeson, 2005). These effects are particularly pronounced when evaluative concerns are high, such as among whites who are high in implicit prejudice (Richeson & Shelton, 2003) or when whites receive feedback that they are responding in racially biased ways. For example, Richeson and Trawalter (2005) found that whites who received false feedback that they were prejudiced against blacks

performed significantly worse on a cognitive task after an interracial interaction compared to whites who had not received this type of feedback. The feedback did not influence whites' performance on the cognitive task after a same-race interaction. Moreover, when cognitive resources are depleted, negative attitudes and stereotypes that were being suppressed "rebound" and are activated even more strongly than they were originally (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998).

Whites' concerns with appearing prejudiced result in negative affective reactions for whites during interracial encounters (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996; Plant & Devine, 2003). Shelton (2003), for example, demonstrated that whites who were instructed to try not to be prejudiced during an interracial interaction reported experiencing more anxiety compared to those who were not given these instructions. Consistent with this reasoning, Apfelbaum, Sommers, and Norton (2008) found that although avoidance of race was seen as a favorable strategy by whites for promoting more positive interracial interactions, in practice, failure to acknowledge race actually predicted decrements in whites' nonverbal friendliness and resulted in *greater* perceptions of racial prejudice by black interaction partners.

The enhanced cognitive demand and increased anxiety that accompany the heightened evaluative (p. 166) concerns, particularly among majority group members low in prejudice, can lead these individuals to behave in ways that are the opposite of their desired or dominant response, ultimately creating confusion about whom to trust during interracial interactions. Vorauer and Turpie (2004) illustrated this process in interactions between whites and native North Americans (members of the First Nations) in Canada. Vorauer and Turpie found that among lower-prejudice whites, those with lower evaluative concerns displayed a similar number of intimacy-building behaviors with First Nations and white interaction partners. Lower-prejudice participants with higher evaluative concerns, however, displayed fewer intimacy-building behaviors toward a First Nations, relative to a white, interaction partner. Among the higher-prejudice whites, those with lower evaluative concerns displayed fewer intimacy-building behaviors with First Nations, relative to white, interaction partners; whereas higher-prejudice whites with higher evaluative concerns displayed a similar number of intimacy-building behaviors with First Nations and white interaction partners. Taken together, these findings suggest that evaluative concerns can disrupt individuals' intended behaviors toward outgroup members, such that lower-prejudiced whites appear less friendly and higher-prejudiced whites appear friendlier than one would predict from their racial attitudes alone.

As Vorauer and Turpie noted, these ironic behaviors could make it difficult for ethnic minorities to detect friend from foe. Indeed, Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, and Trawalter (2005) demonstrated that blacks had a less favorable impression of a white partner with

lower levels of implicit racial bias compared to a white partner with higher levels of automatic racial bias during an interracial interaction. In addition, consistent with Vorauer and Turpie's findings, Shelton et al. found that blacks perceived whites with higher levels of automatic racial bias as being more engaged during the interaction compared to whites with lower levels of bias. Moreover, the more blacks perceived their white partners as being engaged during the interaction, the more positively they evaluated them. More importantly, blacks' perceptions of their white partners' engagement during the interaction mediated the relationship between whites' automatic racial bias and blacks' favorability ratings. Thus, heightened evaluative concerns can cause individuals to behave in ways counter to their dominant response, resulting in the potential for whites and blacks to misjudge one another.

Introspective Illusions

Another consequence of heightened evaluative concerns during intergroup encounters involves misinterpretations by interactants about how they appear to others. Research on egocentric biases in social perception suggests a basic social psychological mechanism for the formation and maintenance of the differing perspectives in intergroup interactions. Because people often have greater access to their own internal mental states (e.g., motivations, intentions) than the mental states of others, they often utilize and weigh introspective information more heavily when making self-judgments than when making judgments of others ("introspection illusion," see Pronin, 2008). In part because of the prominence of one's own mental states, within social interactions actors often fail to recognize that their internal states are not readily visible to their partners, who instead base their interpersonal judgments more on the behaviors of the individuals with whom they are interacting.

One direct consequence of this process is that in intergroup interactions people magnify how their behaviors are likely to appear to outgroup individuals (a signal amplification bias; Vorauer, Cameron, Holmes, & Pearce, 2003). In particular, people believe that their social overtures communicate more interest to potential partners than what is actually conveyed to their partners. Signal amplification bias is reported to be stronger in cross-race interactions than in same-race interactions because the former causes people to feel a heightened sense of self-awareness. That is, cross-group interactions cause people to feel self-conscious, which, in turn, leads people to feel that their internal desires and motives are transparent to others.

Signal amplification bias sets the stage for intergroup misunderstandings because people may anticipate their partners' reciprocating overtures that, unfortunately, were never detected by their partner in the first place. If individuals overestimate the level of interest

and enthusiasm they are communicating to an outgroup member, they will expect outgroup partners to reciprocate with a positive response. However, to the extent that outgroup partners do not perceive the communication as positively as it was intended, favorable "reciprocation" will be unlikely. Consequently, the response will most likely be less enthusiastic than expected. Such a measured response may not only be disappointing and considered a rejection experience, but it also may be taken as evidence of outgroup members' lack of interest in intergroup contact, (p. 167) thus producing divergent perspectives (Shelton & Richeson, 2005).

Again, there is evidence that these effects, which have been studied primarily in interactions between new acquaintances, have cascading effects on more extended intergroup contact. Shelton, West, and Trail (2010) examined how whites and minorities' concerns with appearing prejudiced, measured at the start of the semester, predicted changes in self-reported anxiety and perceptions of those individuals by their roommates, over the course of 15 days. Overall, whites and minorities who were more concerned with appearing prejudiced felt more anxious during their interactions with their roommates, and their anxiety did not change over time. In addition, for whites and minorities high on concerns with appearing prejudiced, their anxious behaviors began to "leak out" after about 10 days of living together. Beginning on the tenth day of the study, respondents started to perceive roommates of another race with greater concerns about appearing prejudiced as being more anxious. By the end of the study (i.e., by the 15th day), individuals with cross-race roommates (but not those with same-race roommates) whose roommates had greater concerns with appearing prejudiced typically liked those roommates less by the end of the 15-day study. Thus, to the extent that efforts to control one's bias can eventually increase anxiety-related behaviors, presumably as people struggle to inhibit prejudice, attempts to control one's bias may backfire and undermine the development of cross-group friendships between roommates.

In summary, although appropriately structured intergroup contact can significantly improve intergroup relations (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2011; Tausch & Hewstone, 2010; Wagner & Hewstone, this volume), intergroup biases can alter the course of intergroup interactions in ways that reinforce and exacerbate biases. People enter these actions with negative expectations, stereotypes, and metaperceptions and are attuned to behaviors that support these preconceptions. People's ambiguous emotional and nonverbal expressions may be interpreted negatively and their attempts to regulate thoughts and behaviors to make a good impression can backfire, at the same time as they overestimate how positively their intentions will be recognized by members of other groups. Thus, intergroup interaction is more challenging cognitively, emotionally, and socially than intragroup interaction. Although intergroup interactions offer significant promise for

improving intergroup relations, they also have the potential for promoting intergroup misunderstandings.

Thus far, we have focused primarily on reciprocal processes that can lead to divergent intergroup perspectives between groups. While many of these processes occur similarly for members of majority and minority groups, some unique effects are associated with differences in group power. In the next section, we examine broader impacts of differences in group power for divergent intergroup perspectives.

Power and Divergent Intergroup Perspectives

Power disparities between groups are characteristic of human societies, across time and across cultures (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Indeed, power dynamics contribute significantly to relations and interactions between racial majority and minority groups, including black-white interactions. However, with racial and ethnic groups, it is difficult to disentangle power difference from cultural or historical influences. Thus, in this section we review research on the dynamics of interactions between high-power and low-power groups, beyond work on black-white relations, to examine generalizable principles for understanding how power shapes intergroup interactions.

Group differences in power create very different social realities and perspectives for members of dominant and subordinate groups. These different realities and divergent perspectives form the basis for the different motivations and goals that members of high-power and low-power groups have in intergroup interactions and socially more generally. As described by Nadler (this volume), members of high-power groups are motivated to be accepted, whereas members of low-power groups seek empowerment (see also Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008). Similarly, in interracial interactions, whites are motivated to be liked, whereas blacks have the goal to be respected (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010). In this section, we discuss how these different motivations relate to divergent group perspectives and shape intergroup interactions.

Several different theories converge to suggest that members of high- and low-power groups have different motivations and goals, particularly with respect to their orientations toward the power structure. Blumer (1958) posited that members of high-power groups have a basic motivation to maintain their relatively advantageous group position, and when they experience a threat to their status, they are particularly motivated to defend their (p. 168) group position (see Bobo, 1999). Similarly, realistic group conflict theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972) proposes that group members are driven by their desire to possess and maintain control over valued resources. Therefore,

members of subordinate groups will compete to gain resources and power, whereas members of dominant groups will act against any threat to losing their resources.

Although it is possible that under some circumstances members of high- and low-power groups may share perceptions and ideologies that will tend to support the status quo (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), research more typically identifies systematic differences between groups. In particular, members of high-power groups are more tolerant and supportive of group-based hierarchy than are members of subordinate groups, and they are more likely to endorse ideologies that legitimize group-based inequality (e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Among the most prominent of the social forces contributing to the maintenance of power disparities are the ideological messages that work to legitimize hierarchy by masking group dominance or make it appear just and natural (Jackman, 1994). In contrast, members of low-power groups tend to display greater support for ideologies that delegitimize hierarchy (e.g., endorsement of human rights, humanitarianism) and see social inequalities as more in need of change. These different goals are reflected in how members of high- and low-power groups view the social structure, support practices that may facilitate change, and are generally aware of group-based discrimination.

These divergent group perspectives shape the behaviors of members of high- and low-power groups in intergroup interaction consistent with their goals, with the potential consequence of reinforcing their group's perspective. In particular, members of high-power groups attempt to *deflect* attention from power differences and thus inhibit change toward equality (Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, high-power groups often focus on individual merit (e.g., the protestant work ethic; Katz & Hass, 1988) or commonalities between members of high- and low-power groups (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009) to draw attention away from group power differences and inequities. Furthermore, because collective resistance is more likely to occur when people recognize their collective disadvantage, an emphasis on commonalities between groups can reduce the likelihood that members of a low-power group will initiate collective action for social change toward equality (Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2010; Wright, 2001; Wright & Lubensky, 2009).

In contrast, members of low-power groups, who are motivated psychologically to be respected and materially to attain desired resources, seek to have their group identity appropriately acknowledged and their disadvantage recognized. Publicly acknowledging and questioning power disparities therefore serves collective efforts for promoting social change toward equality. Nevertheless, members of low-power groups also simultaneously emphasize common identity with members of high-power groups to create a sense of

moral inclusion (Opotow, 1995; see also Opotow, this volume) and sensitize members of high-power groups to the existence of procedural injustices (Tyler & Blader, 2003).

Consistent with the reasoning, Saguy, Dovidio, and Pratto (2008) found both for laboratory groups varying in experimentally manipulated power and for cultural groups varying in social power and influence (Ashkenazim and Mizrahim in Israel) that advantaged group members mostly wished to discuss commonalities between the groups. Members of the disadvantaged group also wanted to talk about commonalities, but they showed a particularly strong interest in talking about what made the groups different.

These different preferences for discussing commonalities and differences not only serve the unique needs of members of each group, but they can further affect the different perspectives on intergroup relations by members of the groups. Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, and Pratto (2009), for instance, manipulated whether members of high- and low-power laboratory groups discussed commonalities (what it is like to be in an experiment) or differences (why the groups differ in power) and measured the effects on group members' intergroup attitudes, on expectations of outgroup fairness among members of the low-power group, and on how members of the high-power group allocated resources. Engaging in discussions of group commonalities, compared to group differences, produced more positive intergroup attitudes for both groups. In addition, it led members of the low-power group to believe that they would be treated more fairly in the subsequent distribution of resources by the high-power group. However, members of the high-power group, whose need to be liked was presumably satisfied and who deflected attention away from group-based disparity in the interaction by emphasizing commonality, did not show a corresponding motivation to achieve equality between the groups: They were just (p. 169) as biased in their allocation of resources when they discussed commonalities as when they discussed group differences.

Taken together, the literature on power differences and intergroup interaction indicates that members of high- and low-power groups enter intergroup interactions with different primary motivations: Members of high-power groups, who are motivated to maintain their group's power, seek acceptance and desire to be liked by the other group; members of low-power groups, whose goal is to improve their group's position, aim for empowerment and respect from the other group. Thus, in intergroup interaction, members of high-power groups try to deflect attention away from group-based differences and promote power-legitimizing ideologies. If successful, there is no need to change the status quo. However, to the extent that cordial relations do not, by themselves, satisfy low-power group members' need for empowerment, these interactions will be experienced less positively by them. These power dynamics may thus help explain why intergroup contact may be less effective (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005), and sometimes ineffective (Binder et al.,

2009), for improving the intergroup attitudes of minority-group members relative to majority-group members (see also Tropp, 2007).

Implications for Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Resolution

These insights into power dynamics between groups, beyond specific instances of racial majority-minority group relations (e.g., blacks and whites in the United States), suggest how basic processes underlying divergent perspectives can be applied to a range of intergroup conflicts at different levels of analysis. Intergroup conflict occurs at a variety of levels and in different forms, including formal conflict between nations, political and personal resistance within a host country to immigrants and refugees from other nations, overt conflict between different ethnic and racial groups within a country or region, and "everyday" bias of members of advantaged groups toward members of disadvantaged groups that systematically reinforce disparities in power, wealth, and well-being. In the present chapter, drawing largely on the literature concerning majority-minority group relations North America, we focused on one element of these complex and often interrelated processes: We discussed how pervasive psychological biases shape intergroup interactions, often in ways that reinforce mistrust and exacerbate conflict. We believe that these processes have implications for understanding conflict and conflict resolution at other levels of analysis. Intergroup contact remains one of the most effective interventions for ameliorating conflict between groups (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Wagner & Hewstone, this volume), but, as demonstrated in the current chapter, these interactions often go awry.

Peace-building efforts require more than formal agreements between nations; they often have to have a foundation of personal connections developed through intergroup contact. Kelman (1999) describes conflict resolution workshops that bring together 8 to 16 influential Palestinian and Israeli leaders in interactive, problem-solving exercises (see also d'Estrée, this volume; Kelman, this volume). These workshops structure intergroup interaction in ways that potentially create coalitions of peace-minded leaders across conflict lines and form a basis for enduring personal relationships. Part of these workshops' effectiveness occurs when ideas generated through contact transported to local discourse, where they have the potential to influence policy. Thus even within the context of intense conflict, it may be possible to be creative and to engineer constructive intergroup interaction for a subset of group members with significant residual effects for the groups as a whole.

The work we reviewed in this chapter, however, reveals that intergroup interactions have to be shepherded in skillful and sensitive ways for successful conflict resolution and prejudice reduction. Otherwise, interaction can escalate rather than alleviate bias. People

tend to be more fearful, on the one hand, and more greedy, on the other hand, when they interact with others as representatives of their respective groups (e.g., race, ethnicity, or nation) than as individuals (Insko et al., 2001). Intergroup biases also do not have to be consciously endorsed; they may be implicit. Moreover, an escalation of bias, mistrust, and conflict can occur even when intergroup intentions are positive—and in part *because of* positive conscious intentions and efforts. Attempts to suppress negative stereotypes and attitudes or to manage one's behavior to appear nonbiased (Apfelbaum et al., 2008; Shelton et al., 2010) can increase one's anxiety and disfluencies in communication. These behaviors, in turn, will likely be interpreted as cues of unfriendliness by members of another group, particularly whenever there are already historical or contemporary reasons for mistrust. In addition, because people believe that their good intentions are transparent to their partners in their interactions, they fail to comprehend (p. 170) the impact of the negative cues (e.g., nonverbal behaviors) that are difficult to monitor and control on their partners' impressions. As a consequence, intergroup interactions are highly susceptible to confusion, miscommunication, and the development of divergent perspectives—which perpetuate intergroup mistrust and bias. These dynamics can play a significant role in chance encounters between groups, as well in formal negotiations between representatives of different nations.

Our analysis of the dynamics of intergroup interaction is meant to be cautionary but not pessimistic. As considerable research on contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006, 2011) reveals, intergroup interaction can be a powerful tool for improving intergroup relations. The disintegration of relations between members of different groups in interaction is far from inevitable. Although intergroup interaction can be a problem, an understanding of the dynamics of intergroup interaction helps to identify effective interventions for resolving conflict.

Traditionally, contact theory has emphasized the importance of establishing the appropriate context to promote positive intergroup relations. Allport's (1954) formulation of intergroup contact theory included four prerequisite features for contact to be successful at reducing intergroup conflict and achieving intergroup harmony. These four features are (1) equal status within the contact situation; (2) intergroup cooperation; (3) common goals; and (4) support of authorities, law, or custom. Since then two other aspects of contact, opportunities for personal acquaintance between the members (particularly involving nonstereotypic elements; Cook, 1984) and intergroup friendships (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998), have been identified as particularly important.

Alternatively, the analyses we have presented about the dynamics of intergroup interactions indicate that strategically reframing relations can facilitate more positive and smoother intergroup interactions, with more coordinated perspectives between

groups. Interventions that alter people's expectations as they enter intergroup interactions can improve initial contact experiences. For example, reminding people of personal experiences in which intergroup contact went better than they expected leads people to be more relaxed in intergroup interactions, anticipate more positive responses from members of other groups, produces more satisfying interactions with other outgroup members, and increases motivation to engage in cross-group contact in the future (Mallett & Wilson, 2010). Also, as Christie and Louis (this volume) note, unilateral actions by leaders, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1978, can dramatically reframe relations in ways that significantly shift how other groups are perceived and pave the way toward peace. Similarly, an act of apology can substantially reframe the way members of different groups see their historical connection, substantially altering the direction for future intergroup relations (see Iyer & Blatz, this volume).

There are other ways to encourage members of different groups to reconceive their relationship with other groups. The basic premise of the common ingroup identity model is that factors that induce members of different groups to recategorize themselves as members of the same, more inclusive group can reduce intergroup bias and conflict through cognitive and motivational processes involving ingroup favoritism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, 2009). Recategorization dynamically changes the conceptual representations of the different groups from an "us" versus "them" orientation to a more inclusive, superordinate connection: "we."

There is considerable evidence that, for both laboratory and naturalistic groups, interventions that establish a common identity or reinforce an existing shared identity (e.g., national or university identity) reduce intergroup threat (Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010), increase willingness to exchange information (Dovidio, Gaertner et al., 1997), and enhance attentiveness to the needs and perspective of members of another group, now included within a superordinate identity. Even when groups do not initially recognize inherent commonalities, they may come to see their interdependence within their conflict. This awareness can help to establish a transcendent common identity (Kelman, 1999) and encourage them to enter into coalitions for peace (Pruitt, 2007).

In terms of the dynamics of contact, inducing members of different groups to attend to their similarities rather than their more typical focus on dissimilarities produces smoother and more favorable initial interactions between members of different groups (Mallett, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008). Moreover, establishing a foundation of trust and openness through common identity can provide a firm basis for the development of close relationships (West, Pearson, Dovidio, Shelton, & Trail, 2009). As Kelman (2005) explains,

the movement toward conflict resolution is an exercise in building "working trust": It is "a process of successive (p. 171) approximations, in which the level of commitment gradually increases with level of reassurance" (p. 639). Traditional approaches to conflict resolution, such as Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT), involves a series of escalating, sequentially reciprocated initiatives that reduce tension and create mutual trust (Lindskold, 1978; Osgood, 1962; see also Christie & Louis, this volume). The success of such efforts requires a deep understanding of the dynamics of intergroup interaction, the context in which these exchanges commonly occur.

However, reducing conflict is often not enough to achieve lasting peace. The psychological needs of members of the low-power group, as well as of the high-power group, need to be met to have true reconciliation (see Nadler, this volume). Thus, interventions such as emphasizing common group identity can help reduce immediate tensions but may be limited in their capacity to create enduring peace if they only meet the needs of members of high-power groups (e.g., for acceptance) and ignore the needs of members of low-power groups (e.g., for respect). Nevertheless, making common identity salient does not require high-power groups to ignore subgroup identities or low-power groups to forsake their subgroup identity. Experimental interventions to induce different representations of groups have demonstrated that creating a dual identity can be just as effective as a one-group identity, and potentially even more so, for reducing bias between groups as a whole (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio 1996; González & Brown, 2003).

Mutual attention to both common and distinctive group identities in intergroup interaction can also foster appreciation of the positive qualities of members of other groups (see Bar-Tal & Hammack, this volume), facilitate greater intergroup understanding, and promote more convergent perspectives on intergroup relations (see Nagda et al., this volume). Cross-cultural evidence, including relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel and Muslims and Hindus in India (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, Pratto, & Singh, 2011) as well as racial groups in Canada (Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009), reveals that a mutual emphasis on commonality is beneficial for improving attitudes and fostering harmony, but it often leads members of different groups to avoid topics that bring to light meaningful differences and disparities that need to be addressed for equality to be realized and reconciliation to occur. Focusing only on similarities and avoiding dimensions of difference produces a cautious, preventive focus (see also Trawalter & Richeson, 2006). By contrast, acknowledging and respecting differences in the context of an overriding common connection encourages a promotion-oriented focus (Plant, Devine, & Peruche, 2010), which ultimately facilitates higher quality and more satisfying intergroup interactions. These interactions provide a more solid foundation for conflict resolution, peace building, and reconciliation.

In conclusion, intergroup interactions are unusually challenging. However, by understanding the processes that lead to divergent intergroup perspectives, it is possible to introduce structural and psychological interventions that can capitalize on the positive motivations that people often have in intergroup interaction to promote mutual understanding, common goals, and coordinated efforts to improve intergroup relations for enduring peace and the benefit of both groups.

Acknowledgment

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